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In this paper I wish to defend a minimalist version of arithmetical 
Platonism — which I shall refer to as ‘minimal Platonism’ — from an 
objection which alleges that an advocate of this view is committed to 
an unduly capacious ontology.1 The objection, which I shall call the 
‘Lightness of Being’ objection, runs as follows. The minimal Platonist 
is committed to the claim that arithmetical objects, such as numbers, 
exist provided that two conditions are met. The fi rst is that terms for 
numerals are singular terms — where something’s being a singular 
 1 For the minimal Platonist view see Wright 1983 and for an approach to metaphysical 
issues which supports his approach to questions about mathematical existence 
Wright 1992. For the objection (and its name) see Divers and Miller 1995. Cf also 
Hale and Wright 2002, 113 for a statement which suggests some sympathy with the 
objection. For a more general critique see Moltmann 2004. 
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term is judged on the basis of purely syntactic criteria.2 The second is 
that some sentences in which these singular terms feature are non-trivi-
ally true.3 However, the names of fi ctional characters are also singular 
terms (when judged by the metaphysically lightweight criteria used by 
advocates of minimal Platonism). Furthermore some sentences which 
feature in fi ctional discourse — sentences such as 
(B)  ‘Holmes lives in Baker Street’ 
and 
(H)  ‘Hamlet acts as though he is mad’ 
may plausibly be judged to be true. So, by parity of reasoning, fi ction-
al characters must exist. But this is a reductio ad absurdum: it offends 
against the ‘robust sense of reality’ which a level-headed Platonist 
ought to cultivate.
Divers and Miller (1995, 132-6) — to whom the objection is due — 
have already argued that a number of initially attractive responses to 
this problem do not stand up to scrutiny. These include reading sen-
tences such as B and H as elliptical versions of 
(B*)  ‘In the stories by Conan Doyle, Holmes lives in Baker Street’ 
and 
(H*)  ‘In Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet acts as though he is mad’4,
denying that sentences about fi ction have assertoric content (so that they 
are not in the market for truth or falsity)5; denying that such sentences 
have a truth-value; adopting an error-theoretic account of fi ctional dis-
course; and arguing that sentences about fi ction, though having genuine 
assertoric content, are not typically the objects of assertion, so that their 
 2 See Hale 1987 chapter 2 for an account of the relevant syntactic criteria and the 
claim that numerals do in fact satisfy them.
 3 The reference to ‘non-trivial’ truth is important here. Minimalist Platonists do 
not standardly claim that the existence of the number 2 follows from the truth of 
sentences such as ‘Either the number 2 exists or it does not.’ 
 4 As suggested in Lewis 1976.
 5 This seems to be the view of Walton 1991 and Currie 1990. 
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general acceptance cannot be construed as a mark of their truth. 6 I shall 
not reproduce their arguments, which I take to be decisive, here.
Instead, I shall argue that, despite initial thoughts to the contrary, 
the minimal Platonist should embrace the capacious ontology which 
the objector takes her to be committed to. My defense of this perhaps 
initially alarming claim will rest on two points. The fi rst is that the 
minimal Platonist should have no objection to claiming that fi ctional 
characters such as Hamlet and Superman are abstract objects. The 
second is that the minimal Platonist is still in a position to argue that 
there is a realism-relevant difference between fi ctional discourse and 
discourse about arithmetic — and hence a difference in metaphysical 
status between fi ctional characters and numbers. The difference is 
that fi ctional discourse lacks a feature that Wright (1992 chs. 3 ff) calls 
‘Cognitive Command’ whereas it is plausible that discourse about 
arithmetic possesses it.7
Before going any further, however, I need to say something about the 
dialectical situation. Divers and Miller’s objection is only an interesting 
one if there are no conclusive reasons for objecting to the existence of 
abstract objects as such. If there were, the objection would be otiose. 
For the purpose of this paper I shall assume that there are not, and that 
 6 Brock 2001 suggests a form of ellipsis account on which (H) should be read as 
‘According to a fi ctional realist’s view of the universe, Hamlet appears to be mad.’ 
But although Divers and Miller don’t specifi cally discuss this possibility, I can’t 
see any reason why their arguments against elliptical readings of S and H can’t be 
applied to Brock’s account.
 7 Those familiar with the debate may feel a sense of déjà vu when presented with my 
response to the Lightness of Being problem, since there are obvious similarities 
between what I say here, and what Hale and Wright (1994) have to say about the 
suggestion that this form of Platonism has the unwelcome consequence that the 
existence of members of parliament can be known a priori on the basis of one’s 
knowledge of the biconditional P: 
  ‘A and B have the same member of parliament iff A and B inhabit the same
 constituency.’ 
   So it is worth making three observations. First, the two problems seem to be 
different. The objection I am dealing with involves only a claim about existence, 
rather than about the a priori knowability of existence. Secondly, even those who 
are prepared to countenance the existence of abstract members of parliament as a 
response to this objection may feel that a commitment to the existence of Hamlet 
and Superman is ontologically extravagant (for example for the reasons discussed 
in section VIII below). If so, the problem is not only different, but arguably more 
serious. Finally, and most importantly, my strategy differs from that of Hale and 
Wright to the extent that the claim that fi ctional discourse lacks cognitive command 
plays an important role in defusing the objection: there is nothing similar to be 
found in the cited paper, or as far as I am aware, in any other place. 
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the dispute between minimal Platonists and nominalists is one that is 
open.8 
This will affect how I present some of the material that follows. For 
example, I shall not consider strategies for objecting to the existence of 
fi ctional characters that take the following schematic form. ‘Fictional 
characters, if they exist, are abstract objects. But there are no abstract 
objects. So, fi ctional characters do not exist.’ Anyone who is in a posi-
tion to assert the second of these premisses already has suffi cient rea-
son to dismiss minimal Platonism — so they do not need the Lightness 
of Being objection. I do not think anyone is in this position. But that is 
not the topic of this paper. 
II  Fictional Objects
If Divers and Miller are correct, the minimal Platonist seems commit-
ted to the existence of some sort of object as the referents of the singular 
terms such as ‘Superman’ and ‘Hamlet.’ However, we should notice 
straight away that nothing commits her to any defi nite view about what 
sort of object these referents might be. It would be genuinely alarming 
if the truth of H committed us to the existence of a fl esh and blood 
Hamlet (along with the rest of his dysfunctional family). However we 
need not think that it does. Instead we could argue that it commits us 
to the fi ctional character Hamlet.9
What are fi ctional characters? Some of the answers that one might 
give to this question are truistic. Fictional characters are the sorts of 
things we talk about when we discuss works of fi ction; their doings are 
described by novelists, dramatists, poets and television script-writers; 
they can have various properties which they seem to have10 in common 
with fl esh-and-blood human beings (such as being brave, resourceful, 
intelligent and so on) as well as other properties which they clearly 
do not have in common with fl esh-and-blood human beings such as 
implausibility, being poorly-developed and so on. These claims are not 
 8 See Burgess and Rosen 1997 part 1 for an assessment of the debate that supports 
the view that the prima facie case for nominalism is far from overwhelming.
 9 This suggestion is not unprecedented: it seems to date back to Kripke 1973. 
It is treated with some sympathy in Evans 1982 (though see below for further 
discussion) and Salmon 1997 (but see n. 17 below for an important difference from 
Salmon’s account). To the best of my knowledge, however, the points I make have 
not been made in prior discussions of arithmetical Platonism.
10 The reasons for this cautious formulation will become apparent in section III 
below.
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matters of philosophical dispute: they would be assented to by meta-
physicians of all stripes.11 
There is, however, a further claim which might be made and which 
is more philosophically substantial. This is the view that fi ctional char-
acters are abstract objects. It is this view which the minimal Platonist 
ought to adopt in response to the Lightness of Being objection
One might worry that this response is ad hoc. If the minimal Platonist 
allows that ‘Hamlet’ refers to an object of some sort, does she have any 
reason to deny that it refers to the same sort of object as ‘Shakespeare’ 
— namely a fl esh and blood human being? Consider a comparison be-
tween the way ‘Hamlet’ functions in H and ‘Rupert Murdoch’ func-
tions in T: 
T:  ‘Rupert Murdoch is the owner of the London Times.’ 
Shouldn’t we say that since the two terms function in the same way 
then if they both refer to something, then they must both refer to the 
same sort of thing?
 The best response to this is to draw attention not to the different 
ways in which singular terms function in H and T, but to differences 
between H and T and the bodies of discourse that they belong to. One 
way of doing so is to consider the very different standards of warrant 
which govern the two bodies of discourse. The canonical grounds on 
which assertions such as T can be made are very different from the 
canonical grounds for assertions such as H. So we should not be sur-
prised that singular terms in the two bodies of discourse in which they 
occur refer to different kinds of objects. 12
11 Whether nominalists are entitled to assent to these claims is another question, but 
not one that I pursue here. 
12 I take this to be unsurprising for the following reason. It seems plausible that 
there should be some connection between the content of a concept and the 
canonical grounds for claiming that it holds of something (cf Peacocke 1992). 
Since the canonical grounds for holding that something is identical with Hamlet 
is very different from the canonical grounds for holding that something is Rupert 
Murdoch, the content of the concepts IS HAMLET and IS RUPERT MURDOCH 
are very different. But in that case why shouldn’t the sorts of objects that fall under 
the two concepts be very different as well. (Notice that the minimal Platonist can 
avail herself of a similar account in order to explain why it is unsurprising that the 
number two is not a concrete object — which, if the objection to my view canvassed 
above is a good one, is something that stands equally in need of explanation.) This 
seems, incidentally, to dispose of at least one of Evans’ (1982) objections to the 
account in question.
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This helps us to understand why the arithmetical Platonist can rea-
sonably take ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Rupert Murdoch’ to refer to different kinds 
of entities. However it doesn’t give us any reason to think that the sort 
of entity that ‘Hamlet’ refers to is an abstract entity. Nevertheless such 
reasons can be given. 
Abstract entities are standardly characterised as being either non-spa-
tial, or causally ineffi cacious, or both.13 And there are good prima facie 
reasons for taking fi ctional characters to have both these properties. If 
‘Hamlet’ does have a referent it is one which we cannot interact with 
causally (except through encounters with representations of him in fi c-
tion.) If someone told us that they had spoken with Hamlet, or visited his 
grave we would not think they were telling us something that was mere-
ly highly unlikely: we would think it impossible. Equally, if ‘Hamlet’ 
refers to an object it must be an object without a spatial location. Where, 
after all would we expect to fi nd the referent of ‘Hamlet’? Certainly not 
in a castle in Denmark. In other words, if we accept the standard charac-
terisation of abstract objects14 we seem to be committed to the claim that 
if Hamlet does refer to an object it must be an abstract object.15 
13 Cf Rosen 2001: ‘If any characterisation of abstract objects deserves to be 
regarded as the standard one it is this: an abstract entity is a non-spatial (or 
non-spatio-temporal) causally inert thing.’ See note 15 below for reasons 
why I take the fi rst of Rosen’s characterisations to be better than the second. 
  It is perhaps worth noticing that although Rosen takes this characterisation to 
be standard, he does not think it is unproblematic. However, Rosen’s arguments, 
and particularly what he has to say about the causal inertness criterion do not strike 
me, or indeed their author, as conclusive. In particular, his argument against the 
causal inertness criterion depends on the no longer uncontroversial assumption 
that the relata of the causal relation are events rather than facts. See Mellor 1995, 
Steward 1997 for discussion. 
14 Hale 1987 expresses some qualms about what I am calling the ‘standard 
characterisation.’ But the objection seems to derive from the idea that appealing 
to the idea that abstract objects are non-spatial in a defi nition of abstractness. One 
can agree with this and still hold that objects which are non-spatial and causally 
ineffi cacious, are as a matter of fact, though not of defi nition, abstract. This is 
enough for my purposes.
15 It might be objected that as well as lacking a spatial location, an object needs to 
lack a temporal location in order to be abstract and that although ‘Hamlet’ lacks 
a spatial location he does not lack a temporal one, since he came into existence 
when Shakespeare started writing about him — and continues to exist to this day. 
However, although this claim seems plausible we do not have to accept it. For 
we might think that although we usually describe authors as creating characters, 
we could think of them as discovering and reporting to us on the denizens of an 
abstract realm which exists independently of them. Or, perhaps more plausibly, 
we could refuse to accept the claim that abstract objects have no temporal location. 
(One reason for doing so is this: stories are abstract objects. But it seems needlessly 
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Of course, someone might raise the problem of how we can acquire 
knowledge of the referent of ‘Hamlet,’ or even have thoughts about 
him or form representations of him. Still, this is not a problem that the 
minimal Platonist — or indeed anyone committed to the existence of 
abstract objects — should be particularly impressed by. She needs to 
provide an account of knowledge, thought and representation that ex-
plains how we can have knowledge, thought and representations of 
other objects with which we cannot interact causally such as numbers 
and directions. 16
III  A Problem About Knowledge
Still, there is a problem lurking in the vicinity. There seems to be a 
strong case for saying that if fi ctional characters are abstract objects 
then we cannot have a posteriori knowledge of them. Abstract objects 
are causally inert, whereas a posteriori knowledge is often thought to 
involve some form of causal interaction with the objects of that knowl-
edge. Equally though, it seems initially implausible to claim that we 
have a priori knowledge of fi ctional characters. If we can have knowl-
edge of fi ctional characters then that knowledge is presumably derived 
from reading fi ction — and hence from a particular kind of experience 
— rather than from refl ection on an a priori knowable criterion of iden-
tity, the way in which the minimal Platonist thinks we can have a priori 
knowledge of numbers.17
paradoxical to insist that stories are discovered rather than created by their 
authors. So stories do seem to have a temporal location. If so there is no diffi culty 
about saying that fi ctional characters do so as well.)
16 Divers and Miller have suggested that one might deal with worries of this sort 
about knowledge of mathematics by arguing that truth in mathematics is in some 
way ‘response-dependent’ or ‘judgment-dependent’ (Divers and Miller 1999). 
One might wonder whether the — perhaps initially more plausible — view that 
truth in fi ction is response-dependent might be deployed in a similar way. The 
suggestion is at least worthy of further consideration. Still it may be worth noticing 
one possible diffi culty. The plausibility of judgment-dependent accounts of truth 
for a particular domain relies on it being possible to give a substantial and non-
circular account of ‘ideal conditions’ for making judgments of a particular kind. 
While I do not think there are any knock-down arguments to show that such an 
account could not be given, I think that it would be very diffi cult to develop and 
defend one within the space of this article. (Thanks to an anonymous referee from 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy for raising this issue.)
17 Not everyone shares the view that any knowledge derived from reading a fi ctional 
text should count as a posteriori. One might think that while reading the text (or 
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This point needs dealing with carefully. The fi rst thing to say about 
it is that although the minimal Platonist may wish to say that refl ec-
tion on an a priori knowable criterion of identity is one way of gaining 
knowledge of the existence of a class of abstract entities, nothing in her 
position need commit her to saying that this is the only possible source 
of a priori knowledge of such claims. So the apparent implausibility of 
the claim that this is the basis for our knowledge of the existence of fi c-
tional characters need not necessarily count against her response to the 
Lightness of Being problem. 
This does not take us very far. Even if the Platonist pushes this line 
she may well feel under some pressure to explain what might give us 
grounds for asserting the existence of fi ctional characters a priori. So it 
is worth considering a bolder response. Before doing so, though, we 
should notice that although the minimal Platonist may be required to 
show that it is possible to have some a priori knowledge of about fi c-
tional characters, it does not require that she show that all of the beliefs 
about fi ctional characters that we have and that we typically take to 
constitute knowledge are acquired in this way. A comparison with the 
arithmetical case brings this out. 
The core of the minimal Platonist account of arithmetical knowledge 
is that arithmetic truths can be known a priori. This modal claim is not 
undermined by the thought that many of the arithmetical beliefs of the 
man in the street might be accepted on what appear to be the most het-
erogeneous and apparently empirical grounds: memory, the evidence 
of the senses and so on. Furthermore, there are beliefs which are in 
some sense about numbers, such as the belief that the number of stu-
dents in a lecture is smaller than the number of seats, which cannot be 
known a priori, even if some a priori knowable truths must fi gure in a 
justifi cation of them. 
Accounting for the relationship between these everyday beliefs and 
the crystalline purity of minimal Platonist logical deductions is likely to 
be a messy job. However there is no need to believe either that it is not 
in principle possible or that it is only possible if we attribute implausi-
ble logical acuity to the majority of competent arithmetical performers. 
What this suggests is that although the minimal Platonist may need to 
show that it is possible to know some truths about fi ctional characters 
on a priori grounds, she need not show that every knowledgeable belief 
seeing the play) is required to grasp the sense of ‘Hamlet,’ no further experience is 
required once I have grasped that sense. On this view the objection is considerably 
less substantial than one might at fi rst think. (Thanks to an anonymous referee 
from Canadian Journal of Philosophy for pointing this out.)
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that we might form about Hamlet or Sherlock Holmes is formed in a 
way which we ground a claim to a priori knowledge. 
While this might make the Platonist’s job more manageable it does 
not show that it can in fact be managed. To see whether it can we need 
to think about what the claim that we can know of the existence of fi c-
tional characters a priori amounts to. It should certainly not be taken as 
entailing that the concept ‘fi ctional character’ is innate. We might doubt 
that anyone who had not been initiated into the practice of story-telling 
could form the concept of a fi ctional character, just as we might suspect 
that only someone who had been initiated into the practice of counting 
could form the concept of a number. 
What is required that anyone who does grasp the concept fi ctional 
character should be capable, on the basis of that grasp, of seeing that 
fi ctional characters exist. However, this should not seem immensely 
implausible — at least to anyone who is prepared to countenance the 
possibility that fi ctional characters do exist. Someone who maintains 
this view holds that our knowledge that fi ctional characters exist de-
rives from our grasp of the concept ‘fi ctional character’ (and further a 
priori refl ection). So we need to ask what is involved in our grasping the 
concept ‘fi ctional character.’
Plausibly, quite a lot is involved: some (perhaps rather rudimentary) 
grasp of what is involved in telling a story and of the basic conven-
tions involved in doing so; some knowledge of how a character can be 
introduced into a story, and of how what is true of them depends on 
what is said about them in the story, and so on. Once this is conceded, 
it should not seem particularly hard to believe that someone who does 
grasp the concept of a fi ctional character might be in a position to know 
of the existence of fi ctional characters without further experience. For 
someone who has such a grasp will be able to construct and understand 
narratives and hence to know truths about the fi ctional characters who 
fi gure in them.18 
This may not convince someone with nominalist scruples. However, 
it is not intended to do so: someone with such scruples is not likely 
to have seen suffi cient merit in the minimal Platonist position to have 
followed the debate to this point. It is merely intended to show that 
the minimal Platonist can formulate a coherent view in response to the 
Lightness of Being problem. Before going further, though, I need to ad-
dress some objections to what has been said so far.
18 Or at any rate, if they cannot, it will not be because of the lack of some particular 
kind of experiences.
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IV  Fictional Objects as Abstract: Further Objections
One serious objection to the suggestion that the referent of ‘Hamlet’ in 
H might be an abstract object is this. Consider the sentence 
(D)  ‘Hamlet lived in Denmark.’ 
Given what Shakespeare tells us about the location of Elsinore, D seems 
as good a candidate for truth as H. But D says something about the 
referent of ‘Hamlet’ — namely that he lived in Denmark. How can an 
abstract object live in Denmark19?
One response to this objection is that if the referent of ‘Hamlet’ is an 
abstract object then the referent of ‘Denmark’ must be one as well. One 
might think that this is a mistake: surely we ought to say that although 
Shakespeare is writing about a fi ctional prince, he is writing about a real 
country. The strength of this objection is diminished somewhat by the 
thought that the Denmark which Shakespeare writes about differs from 
the real Denmark in many respects: for example, it contains a haunted 
castle, inhabitants called Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and so on. So 
it is plausible that Shakespeare’s Denmark is as fi ctional as his Hamlet, 
and that the referent of ‘Denmark’ as used in D is an abstract object.
Still, we are not yet out of the woods. Consider what D says about the 
relationship between the referents of ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Denmark’: namely 
that the referent of ‘Hamlet’ stands in the relationship of ‘living in’ to 
the referent of ‘Denmark.’ The problem is that the relation of ‘living in’ 
is one that holds between human beings and countries, not between 
abstract objects.20 Nevertheless, the way out seems obvious: we need 
to hold that within the context of fi ctional discourse ‘lives in’ picks out 
a relation which is different from the relation that it picks out within 
ordinary biographical discourse.
Is this a step too far? Perhaps. For the view that fi ctional characters 
are abstract objects to be at all plausible, the move we have just made 
19 Salmon 1997 avoids this problem by saying that D is false, since Hamlet, being 
an abstract object, cannot live anywhere. More generally he holds that fi ction and 
literary criticism consists of a set of sentences that, if used assertorically, would 
state a set of falsehoods about a class of abstract objects. As well being counter-
intuitive, this move would be dialectically inappropriate as part of a response to 
the Lightness of Being problem, which can only get off the ground if we take S, H 
and D to be true.
20 This problem is hinted at by Evans 1982, 367. Evans thinks the problem can be 
circumvented, but it is not clear to me from whether the solution I have suggested 
is along the same lines as his. 
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will have to be generalised. Otherwise the same problem will keep 
arising. So we seem committed to saying that a wide range of predi-
cates and relations (if not all) will have different referents when used 
in fi ctional discourse from the referents which they have in everyday 
speech.21 This leaves us faced with two mysteries. First, why do we use 
the same words when talking about fi ction as we do in non-fi ctional 
discourse? Second, why do we suppose that if someone understands 
certain words used in ordinary discourse, they will also understand 
them when used in fi ction22? 
Both of these points need detailed answers. However, there are two 
points we can make which lessen the pressure on the Platonist. First, we 
should notice that views of this type are not unprecedented within ana-
lytic philosophy. Frege — to take but one Platonist philosopher of math-
ematics — is committed to the idea that in indirect speech the reference 
of a word varies from the one which it has in normal speech in a system-
atic way23; and Russell — to take another — holds that the reference of 
number terms in sentences of pure arithmetic is type-ambiguous.
 So much the worse for Frege and Russell, one might respond. Still, 
it is plausible that the worry would be relieved if it we could show that 
the referents of words in discourses about fi ction were related in some 
21 Someone might worry that this leads us to say something particularly implausible 
about historical novels such as War and Peace. For they might think that it is an 
important fact that the action of this novel that it takes place in the terrestrial 
Russia, and not some abstract substitute for it. But this view seems to be untenable, 
if we need to say that statements such as (A) ‘Prince Andrei was born in Russia’ are 
true. (We could avoid this step if we could read statements such as A as elliptical 
for ‘In the story, Prince Andrei was born in Russia’ — but as I point out above, 
Divers and Miller have shown that this option is not available to the arithmetical 
Platonist.)
22 Arguably, there are two further questions that one might ask — namely, why on 
this account we should be interested in fi ction, or think that we can learn about 
the real (concrete) world from it. These are clearly important issues. However, I 
suspect that an adequate answer to the fi rst two questions would bring an answer 
to these further problems. (I am indebted to Sandrine Berges for pressing this 
question.)
23 Admittedly, there is an important difference between Frege’s view and the sort 
of view that I am defending: Frege allows that the reference of a word may vary 
depending on its context of syntactic embedding (hence his view can be seen as 
illustrating the importance of the context principle) where as I am suggesting 
that it might vary depending on its context of use. Still, this does not undermine 
the point I am making — namely that a grasp of what we ordinarily regard as 
the (unambiguous) meaning of a word may (on principles which logicists are 
committed to) licence us to (and enable us to) assign it different references in 
different contexts. (I am indebted to John Divers for pressing this point.)
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systematic fashion to their homonyms in non-fi ctional discourse (just 
as a defender of Russell might respond to worries about the system-
atic ambiguity of number terms). Working out such a view in detail 
would be a big job. But one way of doing so would be to appeal to the 
ways in which words can have their senses extended through the use 
of  analogy. 
What is noticeable about analogical uses of words is that although 
they seem to generate new senses, they do so in a way which is usually 
understandable by most people who understood the original sense of 
the word. Consider someone who talks about the health of the econo-
my. It is notable that most people who have a grasp of what it is for a 
person or animal to be healthy do not need a new explanation of the 
word health in order to understand what it is for an economy to be 
healthy. Nevertheless, it is highly implausible that the word ‘healthy’ 
has the very same sense in both cases.24 
A further objection to the view that fi ctional discourse involves refer-
ence to abstract objects is raised by Gareth Evans (Evans 1982 367). Ev-
ans argues that most fi ctional discourse cannot be correctly construed 
as involving reference to characters understood as a class of abstract 
object. On Evans’ view, for someone to succeed in referring to objects 
of a particular class they must know an appropriate criterion of iden-
tity for objects of that class. (Evans 1975,1982) However, most people 
who talk about fi ction do not know a general criterion of identity for 
fi ctional characters since they are, for example, unable to answer ques-
tions about whether the same character can appear in two works by 
different authors.25 
24 I am indebted to several long discussions (whose upshot I may nonetheless have 
misrepresented) with Roger White (Leeds) for this idea. Is this view incompatible 
with the thought that I appear to be able to understand the sentence ‘the soldiers 
were in the barracks’ without knowing whether the context is fact-stating or 
fi ctional? Not necessarily. For there is one thing that I can know without knowing 
this — namely, what has to be the case for someone making this assertion in one or 
other context to be speaking truly. This is surely one legitimate sense of understand 
here. Plausibly, it is also the only one. At any rate, there is a sense in which I can 
be said to have misunderstood the utterance if I object to it on the grounds that 
there is no barracks in the vicinity, only to discover that I have been overhearing 
a conversation about War and Peace (I am indebted to John Divers for raising this 
issue).
25 This may be a slightly clumsy way of putting the objection. There may be no 
generally statable criterion of identity for fi ctional characters as such, for two 
different reasons. First, the appropriate criteria might be genre-dependent: they 
might operate differently in (say) literary novels of the twentieth century and 
epics transmitted through an oral tradition. Secondly, and more radically, an 
enormously wide range of types of entity can fi gure as fi ctional characters: human 
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 One might hope to respond to this challenge in various ways. One 
which I note without endorsing is that there seem to be some cases 
where people appear to engage in a form of discourse without in fact 
having a clear grasp of the identity conditions for the objects to which 
they are making reference. For example, although I am fairly ignorant 
of chemistry there is a perfectly clear sense in which I can talk about 
the element uranium despite only having the vaguest grasp of how one 
would distinguish one chemical element from another. (For example, I 
might know that Uranium and Plutonium are distinct elements without 
having a clear grasp of the concept of atomic number.) Evans might say 
that in this case I do not really have a clear grasp of chemical discourse, 
and that my ability to engage in discussions in which such discourse 
is employed is parasitic on the existence of individuals who have the 
knowledge that I lack. But it is not obvious that we could not say some-
thing similar about reference to fi ctional objects. 26
Someone might doubt this on the grounds that although most people 
know who to turn to when scientifi c expertise is in question, the same 
is not true in the case of philosophical knowledge — which is what 
is required for disentangling questions about the ontology of fi ctional 
characters. She might also add that people talking about fi ctional char-
acters do not in general hold their use of words to be responsible to the 
judgment of philosophers in the way in which people talking about 
chemical elements hold their use responsible to that of chemists.
An alternative response to Evans would be to argue that someone 
can possess a suffi cient grasp of the criteria of identity for a class of 
objects to make it legitimate for her utterances to be construed as refer-
beings, mythical beasts, God, computers, items of furniture, and (in one work 
by Douglas Adams) highly intelligent shades of the colour blue. Given that it is 
inappropriate to ask for a criterion of identity for entities in general, it might be 
equally inappropriate to ask for a criterion of identity for kinds of object in general. 
  Nevertheless, I take it that Evans’ point would be answered equally well by the 
suggestion that competent readers of fi ction grasp a range of different criteria of 
identity corresponding to different fi ctional genres and different kinds of fi ctional 
character. Thanks once more to John Divers for helpful discussion. 
26 Some readers have been so incensed by this suggestion that they have failed to 
notice that my discussion contains an alternative, independent response to the 
objection two paragraphs later. But I am not entirely sure why the suggestion 
should be seen as infl ammatory. It’s certainly not obvious that division of linguistic 
labour can only occur when physically locatable objects are in play — though many 
of the most common examples are of this sort. But the idea that a mathematical 
dunce’s reference to, say, the Riemann delta function could exhibit some of the 
same features as Bush’s reference to uranium is one which, although unlikely to 
recommend itself to the convinced nominalist, is surely not obviously absurd. 
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ring to objects of that class even if they are not able to answer every 
possible question about the identity of such objects that might conceiv-
ably arise. On an account like this, if someone is able to distinguish be-
tween and count characters within individual fi ctions, then they have 
suffi cient grasp of the identity conditions of characters to be construed 
as referring to characters, even if they cannot answer questions about 
whether the Sherlock Holmes who appears in the Conan Doyle stories 
is the same fi ctional character as the Sherlock Holmes who is played 
on fi lm by Basil Rathbone. Since most people do have this fairly mini-
mal competence they can indeed be taken to be referring to fi ctional 
characters.
This suggestion is attractive because it also allows us to preserve 
the intuitively plausible belief that people can succeed in referring to 
composite material objects and to persons even though they are unable 
to produce adequate resolutions of the Ship of Theseus paradox or to 
the sorts of problem cases about personal identity which have been 
widely discussed by Parfi t (Parfi t 1986) and others. They can do so be-
cause they have an ability to discriminate objects or persons which is 
adequate in most of the cases in which such an ability is called upon 
— even if under certain extreme cases this ability might break down.27 
V  Allism: Navigating Some Shallows
At a number of points in their ‘Lightness of Being’ paper, Divers and 
Miller suggest that the minimal Platonist position may be vulnerable to 
the complaint that it supports a commitment to something they call an 
‘allist’ ontology (Divers and Miller 1995, 130). ‘Allism’ is, of course, not 
a precisely defi ned philosophical term. At one point, Divers and Miller 
characterise it as a commitment to ‘all such objects as may appear to 
constitute the subject matter of any discourse in which we indulge or 
27 It is plausible that our ability to refer to numbers without being able to say whether 
the 2 of the natural numbers is the same number as the 2 of the rationals or the 
reals is an instance of the same phenomenon. Arguably it is more dialectically 
effective too: while some people seem happy to concede that the upshot of problem 
cases about personal identity is that there are really no persons, I have yet to see 
anyone argue that most people do not succeed in referring to numbers because 
of their diffi culty in answering questions of this sort. But the issues here are not 
suffi ciently independent of the issues that are under discussion here to provide a 
reliable source of independent support for the position I am defending.
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could contrive.’ (Divers and Miller 1995, 130). I shall christen this view 
‘Indiscriminate Allism.’
Indiscriminate Allism seems untenable. However, as Divers and Mill-
er effectively concede, one can consistently accept an argument for the 
existence of fi ctional objects, while disavowing Indiscriminate Allism 
(Divers and Miller 1995, 131). For some putative discourses may fail to 
sustain standards of syntax and discipline which warrant us in taking 
them to be even minimally truth-apt.28 If this line of thought is correct, 
someone who accepts the minimalist argument for fi ctional objects has 
argumentative resources that will allow them to avoid commitment to 
the existence of, say, Cartesian private objects, selves, possibilia and the 
like, and thereby to escape being saddled with a commitment to Indis-
criminate Allism. 
Still, one might take the minimalist Platonist to be committed to a 
less extreme view than Indiscriminate Allism, which I shall call ‘Mod-
erate Allism.’ The Moderate Allist is not committed to the existence of 
‘all such objects as may appear to constitute the subject matter of any 
discourse in which we indulge or could contrive,’ (italics mine) but 
only to those that in fact constitute the subject matter of discourses sus-
taining appropriate standards of syntax and discipline. I take it that the 
minimalist Platonist is committed to Moderate Allism. But, while Div-
ers and Miller appear to take it that a commitment to ‘Moderate Allism’ 
is no less problematic than a commitment to ‘Indiscriminate Allism,’ I 
shall try to show that it is less problematic than one might think. 
We can distinguish three different sources of objection to Moder-
ate Allism. One is based simply on the fact that the Moderate Allist 
is committed to the existence of fi ctional characters (in precisely the 
way I have been arguing in this paper.) Divers and Miller’s choice of 
fi ctional characters as paradigms of the sort of objectionable ontology 
that minimal Platonists might fi nd themselves committed to suggests 
that they may have some sympathy with this as an objection to Moder-
ate Allism. But whatever the truth of this speculation about Divers and 
Miller’s intentions, this line of thought is unapt at the present point in 
the dialectic. It is simply circular to claim that a commitment to the ex-
istence of fi ctional objects is problematic on the grounds that it entails 
a commitment to Moderate Allism, and then say that what is wrong 
with Moderate Allism is that it entails accepting the existence of fi c-
tional characters. The defensibility of this sort of resistance to Moderate 
28 It is, of course, a presumption of the ‘Lightness of Being’ objection that discourse 
about fi ctional characters is not such a discourse. See Divers and Miller, 131-2 for 
brief discussion
468 Bill Wringe
 Allism is entirely dependent on their being independently grounded 
objections to the claim that fi ctional objects exist. 29 
A second sort of resistance to Moderate Allism may be based on the 
perceived extremism of the view. Those who embrace it may fi nd them-
selves met by David Lewis has characterised as an ‘incredulous stare.’ 
But as Lewis himself remarks, a propos of reactions to his own someist, 
but still populous ontology, ‘an incredulous stare is not an argument.’ 
(Lewis 1973 86).We are in the business of considering arguments, not 
facial expressions. 
In any case, it is worth observing that in the current context, the in-
credulous stare lacks force. For on the Moderate Allist line, answers 
to questions about what sorts of object exist depend on prior answers 
to questions about precisely which discourses exhibit the appropriate 
standards of syntax and discipline. Since this is the case, it is far from 
being obvious what the incredulous starer is actually staring at, and 
whether the incredulity of the stare is warranted. 
A third source of objection to Moderate Allism deserves more serious 
consideration. This is that accepting Moderate Allism might be tanta-
mount to adopting a ‘quietist’ attitude to metaphysical disputes, where 
quietism is understood as the view that ‘signifi cant metaphysical de-
bate is impossible’ (Wright 1992, 205).30 Whatever one’s views about the 
merits of quietism, this line of thought is an effective ad hominem against 
Wright’s own adherence to the minimalist Platonist viewpoint.31 For 
Wright takes a commitment to quietism to be mistaken. 
Two points need to be made about this. First, the existence of a dis-
tinction between Indiscriminate and Moderate Allisms already leaves 
open a space in which signifi cant metaphysical debate can take place. 
Second, when taken at a purely ad hominem level, the argument mis-
fi res badly. For it trades on a contentious and highly suspect concep-
tion of what substantive metaphysical debate has to be like, and one 
that Wright explicitly rejects. The mistaken conception depends on the 
idea that substantive metaphysical debate must involve looking into 
our apparent ontological commitments in order to see which of them 
are genuine and which spurious. 
29 I take myself to have dealt with the most signifi cant such objections elsewhere in 
my paper. (see in particular sections III, IV and X)
30 I take it that Wright has in mind here specifi cally debates about what sorts of things 
exist — one might, for example, be a quietist according to Wright’s terminology 
but still have quite fi rm views about, for example, the nature of the composition 
relation, or whether causation is metaphysically prior to laws. 
31 As Divers and Miller themselves point out: Divers and Miller 1995, 137.
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Wright has argued — in more or less explicit objection to this con-
ception of what metaphysical debate must be like — that there are (at 
least) four realism-relevant tests which we can apply to a body of dis-
course whose judgments are truth-apt.32 First, we can ask whether the 
discourse possesses a property that Wright calls Cognitive Command. 
Second, we can ask whether true judgments made using the concepts 
characteristic of the discourse are response-dependent. Third, we can 
ask about the range of states of affairs into which true sentences in the 
discourse are capable of explaining. Finally, we can address the ques-
tion of whether truth in the discourse is verifi cation transcendent. Since 
a commitment to Moderate Allism is compatible with the view that we 
can ask any of these questions about any discourse, and since defend-
ing any answer to any of them entails a commitment to substantial 
metaphysical debate it is simply false that a commitment to Moderate 
Allism entails a commitment to quietism.33
VI  Cognitive Command and Fictional Discourse
In the previous section I argued that the threat of allism did not consti-
tute an overwhelming objection to the view which I have been advocat-
ing. However, signifi cantly more can usefully be said at this point. For 
I take there to be an important metaphysical intuition underlying the 
‘someist prejudice’ which Divers and Miller display in their discussion 
of allism. This is that it is outrageous to hold both that numbers exist 
and that they are no more real than fi ctional characters.
However, as may already be apparent, the minimal Platonist need not 
fi nd herself forced into this position. She has resources that enable her 
to make sense of an important motivating intuition that underpins the 
objection, without accepting the objection on its own terms. In order to 
argue that numbers are more ontologically robust than fi ctional charac-
ters, the minimal Platonist need only argue that arithmetical  discourse 
32 Wright 1992 passim
33 This deals with the objection at an ad hominem level. But it has only been answered 
substantively if one agrees with Wright that his tests are indeed realism-relevant, 
and that discussion of them therefore involves signifi cant metaphysical debate. 
I think there is some evidence that Divers and Miller would agree that they are. 
While there is no space in this paper to discuss all of Wright’s tests in detail I give 
a brief account of why Wright takes Cognitive Command to be realism-relevant 
in the following section. For further discussion see Wright 1992 passim, Edwards 
1994.
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passes, and fi ctional discourse fails one of Wright’s four tests. During 
the remainder of this paper, I shall develop this idea at more length, 
arguing in particular that fi ctional discourse lacks the property Wright 
calls Cognitive Command.34
Wright characterises Cognitive Command as follows: 
a discourse exerts cognitive command if and only if it is a priori that differences 
of opinion formulated within the discourse, unless excusable as a result of vague-
ness in a disputed statement, or in the standards of acceptability or variation in 
personal evidence thresholds …. will involve something which may be properly 
regarded as cognitive shortcoming. (Wright 1992 144)35
34 Width of cosmological role is not a good test because nominalists like Field 
might deny that numbers enter into best explanations of any facts. Issues about 
verifi cation transcendence are also dialectically unworthy of pursuit — although it 
may be plausible that superassertibility is the ground of truth in fi ctional discourse, 
mathematical antirealists of a Dummettian stripe will want to claim that the same 
is true of mathematics. 
35 Clearly this characterisation places a lot of weight on the question of what can 
properly be held to count as a cognitive shortcoming. Wright is not particularly 
forthcoming about this: his offi cial view (from which I dissent — see footnote 
39 below) seems to be that the onus is always on those who claim a discourse 
does possess cognitive command to sketch a plausible epistemology according 
to which errors of the relevant sort (i.e. those not due to vagueness in meaning or 
standards of acceptability, or variation in evidence thresholds) can be shown to be 
cognitive (149). But whether this kind of burden shifting is acceptable might well 
be thought to depend on the contours of a particular debate. In particular, it might 
be though that in the context of the current debate the onus was on the advocate of 
my view to give some reasons for thinking that no such epistemology was likely 
to be forthcoming. Wright’s discussion of comic discourse (148 ff) can be seen as 
providing a paradigm of how such a discussion might go: his claim is that no 
epistemology of the sort that an advocate of the view that discourse about what is 
funny would need to provide is to be expected because of the way in which such 
discourse is sensibility-involving (5-7). To anticipate somewhat: what I say below 
might be characterised as trying to make the conclusion that fi ctional discourse is 
sensibility involving seem equally plausible — and as arguing that this is all that 
is required here. (Of course, one might respond that the fact that a discourse is 
sensibility-involving is not itself reason to take it to lack Cognitive Command — as 
proponents of a neo-Humean view of moral judgments such as David Wiggins 
(Wiggins 1987) would no doubt protest. What one needs as well are reasons to 
think that sensibilities differ and lack of reason to think that the discourse possesses 
means of bringing these differences under control. It is arguable — though it does 
need to be argued (and has been) that moral discourse possesses these resources. 
I see no reason to think that comic, and, more importantly for the purposes of 
this paper, fi ctional discourse does, - and give my reasons for this in the main text 
below.) 
Making the Lightness of Being Bearable 471
Whether or not a discourse exerts Cognitive Command is a meta-
physically substantial matter, on Wright’s view. For, he claims, it is 
only if a discourse passes this test that we can see judgments which are 
framed in its characteristic vocabulary as representations of a reality 
which is independent of those who make the judgment (Wright 1992, 
88-94).36
Prima facie it is highly plausible that discourse about arithmetic pos-
sesses cognitive command.37 So the minimal Platonist should argue that 
fi ctional discourse lacks this property. This claim also seems plausible. 
Consider two critics who disagree about whether Hamlet is genuinely 
mad. The dispute need not be down to vagueness in the term ‘mad’ 
— what is at issue is not, for example, whether some twentieth century 
clinical diagnosis is applicable to him, but whether or not he is merely 
feigning madness. Nor need it be a matter of differing standards of 
evidence, if this is taken to mean differences about how strong the evi-
dence has to be before someone is convicted of madness, or before liter-
ary critical statements can be accepted. Finally, it is not obvious — and 
36 I have said that on Wright’s view passing the Cognitive Command test is a 
necessary condition for viewing representations in a particular form of discourse 
to be viewed as representations of some form of independent reality. This seems 
plausible. However, it might seem less clear whether it is a suffi cient condition. 
However, I take it that Wright views his test not as providing evidence for the idea 
that some realm has independent existence but as an informative explication of 
what claims about independence come to. If this is right, then once we have settled 
the question of whether a discourse passes the Cognitive Command test, there is 
no further question to be asked about whether we can regard claims formulated in 
its characteristic vocabulary as claims about an independent reality.
37 For the record it is worth noting that Wright’s offi cial view seems to be that we can 
never simply assume that a discourse possesses Cognitive Command (Cognitive 
Command has to be earned). But this seems like a mistake. It is true is that the 
question of how arithmetic discourse comes to possess Cognitive Command is a 
genuine one which an adequate philosophy of mathematics needs to provide an 
answer to. But that is no reason for regarding the question of whether it has that 
property as open. (Note that the claim being made here is restricted to discourse 
about elementary arithmetic. Given the independence of the Axiom of Choice and 
Continuum Hypothesis, from other axioms of ZF set theory and the existence of 
disagreements among mathematicians, it is not clear that we can assume with 
the same degree of insouciance that set theoretic discourse possesses Cognitive 
Command.) As John Divers has pointed out to me, if we restrict our attention 
to quantifi er-free arithmetic, we can go further and say that it is not merely 
plausible, but certain that it possesses Cognitive Command. For it is decidable, 
and decidability entails Cognitive Command. (But one might conceivably wonder 
whether a quantifi er free discourse possesses a suffi cient degree of syntax and 
discipline to build a case for reference/existence on.)
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certainly not obvious that it is a priori — that anything clearly describ-
able as a cognitive shortcoming must be involved in the dispute.38 
 Suppose that the difference of opinion turns on a difference about 
what is the most coherent overall interpretation of the play. If, as may 
well happen, there is, overall, no clear case for preferring one inter-
pretation to the other then it seems reasonable to say that the dispute 
over the truth value of ‘Hamlet is mad’ involves no cognitive short-
coming.
 It is sometimes suggested that in order to be able to tell whether 
Wright’s test is a signifi cant one and whether or not particular stretches 
of discourse pass it we need to be able to provide a detailed and, per-
haps, independently motivated account of what it is for a certain kind 
of shortcoming to be a cognitive shortcoming (Williamson 1994, Sains-
bury 1996). If this demand were reasonable, this would place a heavy 
burden on someone who wanted to defend the view I am defending. 
Producing such an account is no trivial matter. 
However, I am not sure that the demand is reasonable. It is reason-
able to ask for some explanation of what the distinction between the 
cognitive and the non-cognitive is supposed to amount to in this con-
text, and why one should think that particular cases fall on one side or 
the other. One way of doing this would, of course be to produce a full 
and independently motivated account of the cognitive. 
However, it seems to me that in the case under discussion we can 
make do with less. What we need is some kind of account of how dis-
agreements about fi ctional discourse might arise in ways which we did 
not want to put down to cognitive error (or vagueness, or differences in 
standards of acceptability or evidence thresholds.) It might still be open 
to an opponent to say that contrary to appearances, errors that arose in 
the specifi ed ways were nonetheless cognitive errors. Such responses 
would have to be assessed on their merits, of course. But their bare 
possibility need not show that we need a complete articulation of the 
notion of the cognitive in advance.
If I am right, then the appropriate demand to make of someone de-
fending my view is that they give a plausible explanation of why fi c-
tional discourse should lack cognitive command. I think this can be 
done. The key point is this. Fictional discourse involves more than 
registering what is strictly entailed by sentences in a text. It also in-
38 This is not to deny that in some — perhaps most — cases, disputes about what the 
best interpretation of a text is may be down to cognitive shortcomings. What is at 
issue is whether it is a priori that all such disputes must be. 
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volves using them as props for imaginative elaboration.39 We can see 
this in the Hamlet case: Shakespeare never tells us clearly whether or 
not Hamlet is mad: the question is left to the spectator to ponder. Of 
course, not every imaginative elaboration is as good as every other: 
there are constraints of psychological plausibility and consistency to 
be obeyed as well as other more local constraints determined by the 
genre of text under consideration. However, it does not follow from 
the fact that interpretations are subject to some constraints that these 
constraints must determine a unique answer to every psychological 
fi ction, still less that this is true a priori. In fact, given the ways in which 
people’s imaginative responses vary, it would be very surprising if it 
were true at all.40
VII  Logical Scruples (1) — Truth-Value Gaps
One way of denying that fi ctional discourse lacks cognitive command 
is to suggest that in the envisaged case the correct thing to say is that 
Hamlet is neither mad nor feigning. If so, then both participants to the 
dispute above can be represented as committing an error — namely 
the error of thinking that there is a defi nite answer to the question of 
whether Hamlet is mad or sane, when in fact there is not.
Tempting as this suggestion might be, we need to be careful just how 
we put the point. As I shall try to show, we cannot allow it to stand 
in the somewhat crude terms that I have just formulated. In addition 
to this, the most natural reformulation is one that is not available to 
someone who is pushing the Lightness of Being objection. So either the 
objection lapses or the defense succeeds. 
Suppose the person maintaining that fi ctional discourse possesses 
Cognitive Command takes the most obvious line and suggests that we 
should assent to 
(N):  ‘Hamlet is neither mad or feigning.’ 
It would be reasonable to protest that assent to N is untenable. For while 
it might be the case that it is consistent with the text of Shakespeare’s 
39 The idea of fi ctional texts as props for imaginative elaboration is drawn from 
Walton 1991, though I do not think he would endorse anything else I say here. 
40 In effect I am arguing that (an important subclass) of judgments about fi ction are 
sensibility-involving, just as for Wright, judgments about what is comic — his 
prime example of a discourse lacking cognitive command — are.
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play that Hamlet is mad and equally consistent with the text that he is 
feigning, it is surely not consistent with the text that he is neither. So we 
should surely deny N.41
This might lead one to think that the point should be expressed thus: 
While we should deny N and instead assert 
(V):  ‘Hamlet is either mad or feigning.’ 
we should still deny both
(M):  ‘Hamlet is mad.’ 
and 
(F):  ‘Hamlet is feigning.’ 
But we are still not out of the woods. Typically a disjunction is only true 
if one of its disjuncts is true.42
Plausibly, the point the objector wants to make might be put thus43: 
what we should be concerned with are not statements like D, M, and F, 
but statements such as FD, FM and FF as follows:
FD:  ‘In the fi ction it is true that Hamlet is either mad or feigning.’
FM:  ‘In the fi ction Hamlet is mad.’
FF:  ‘In the fi ction Hamlet is feigning.’
41 Assuming that consistency with the text is a necessary, if not suffi cient condition 
for fi ctional truth, at least in the case of texts which are not themselves internally 
inconsistent. 
42 There are cases where this principle seems to fail. For example, there are treatments 
of vague predicates on which we can say that ‘Those curtains are red’ and ‘Those 
curtains are orange’ both fail of truth, even though ‘Those curtains are either 
red or orange’ is clearly true. One way of accommodating this is to appeal to a 
supervaluational semantics for vague predicates. So we might wonder whether 
a similar idea would work in the case of fi ctional discourse. I am not sure that it 
would. Notice that as well as being able to provide a satisfactory formal treatment 
of the discourse in this way, we would have to motivate it in a way which did not 
give us grounds for thinking that ‘true’ was ambiguous as between statements 
about fi ction and statements about arithmetic and that the statements like M did not 
possess hidden quantifi cational structure (so as to be elliptical for something like 
‘In every acceptable interpretation of the story…’). If either of these provisoes were 
ignored there would be a danger of the Lightness of Being objection lapsing.
43 Cf. Lewis 1976.
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Arguably, FD should not be read as a simple disjunction of FM and FH. 
If so, the option of assenting to FD while assenting to neither of FM and 
FH remains open. 
If this option is available the Lightness of Being objection lapses. If 
statements such as M and F are to be read as elliptical in this way, then 
there is no reason for thinking that in asserting M one is genuinely com-
mitted to the existence of Hamlet, any more than would be in asserting 
S: ‘Shakespeare made up a story about someone called ‘‘Hamlet’’ who 
was mad.’44
But in fact, as Divers and Miller (1995, 132-3) have pointed out, this 
response is not available to the arithmetical Platonist. It requires us to 
read sentences like ‘Hamlet is mad’ as elliptical for ‘In the fi ction Ham-
let is mad.’ If she allows that this is possible then she will need good 
grounds for holding that M should be read elliptically while denying 
that a similar elliptical reading can be given to sentences about math-
ematics. For fi ctionalists about mathematics (such as Field 1980) will 
be quick to urge on her the merits of reading P: ‘There are three prime 
numbers between 5 and 17’ as elliptical for FP ‘According to the stan-
dard story about numbers there are three prime numbers between 5 
and 17.’ On such a reading, the apparent commitment to the existence 
of numbers which we evince when making assertions about arithmetic 
appears to vanish. 
The most obvious way of circumventing this challenge — and one 
which should certainly be attractive to an arithmetical Platonist of 
Wright’s stripe is to insist that in the arithmetical case we need to focus 
on the surface syntax of sentences which appear to involve singular 
terms. If this is so in the arithmetical case, then - as Divers and Mill-
er point out, the arithmetical Platonist cannot appeal to an elliptical 
reading of M, H and the like to avoid commitment to the existence of 
fi ctional characters. But equally, someone who wants to press the objec-
tion cannot make claims about fi ction which rely on the elliptical read-
ing in order to rebut the claim that fi ctional discourse lacks cognitive 
command.
44 This might look like weaseling: someone might want to say that even under the 
elliptical reading ‘Hamlet’ operates like a singular term. If so, it looks embarrassing 
for the arithmetical Platonist. But the Platonist has no need to worry provided 
that we deny that ‘in the fi ction’ provides a factive context. I am indebted to Erik 
Koed — who remains unconvinced — for discussion of these points.
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VIII  Logical Scruples (2) — Cognitive Command and 
 Epistemically Constrained Truth
Shapiro and Taschek, and also Mark Sainsbury, have pointed out that 
there seems to be an inconsistency in holding that truth in a particular 
area is epistemically constrained, and holding that discourse about that 
area lacks cognitive command. (Sainsbury 1996, Shapiro and Taschek 
1996).45 Wright (2001) suggests that the argument can be formulated as 
follows. Suppose that A believes p and B believes not p, and suppose 
that there is no cognitive shortcoming in either case. Now suppose that 
p is true. Since truth in this domain is epistemically constrained, p is 
knowable. Since p is knowable, and B believes not p, B suffers from 
a cognitive shortcoming: he fails to know something he could have 
known, contrary to our initial assumption. So the assumption that p 
leads to contradiction. Since this is the case, we can take it that not p. 
But if not p is true, then again, it is knowable that not p. So A fails to know 
something she might have known, and has an epistemic shortcoming. 
Again we have a contradiction. Upshot: On the assumption that A 
believes p and B believes not p, and truth is epistemically constrained, 
we generate a contradiction from the claim that neither A nor B have 
any cognitive shortcoming. So that claim must be false. 
As Wright has pointed out, every step in the reasoning which 
generates a contradiction from the combination of 1) A believes p; 2) 
B believes not p; 3) Neither A nor B has a cognitive shortcoming; 4) 
the truth as to whether p is knowable; is intuitionistically acceptable 
(Wright 2001 60-1, 85). However, Wright (2001 p85) also goes on to point 
out that the move from this contradiction to the further claim: ‘Either 
A or B has some kind of cognitive shortcoming’ involves an inference 
that someone with a commitment to intuitionistic logic might take 
exception to. If we are intuitionists we can’t infer directly from the fact 
that the claim that neither A nor B has a cognitive shortcoming leads 
to a contradiction that either A or B has a cognitive shortcoming. We 
can only infer that it is not the case that neither A nor B has a cognitive 
shortcoming. 
 Does this point help to show that a discourse can lack cognitive 
command while still being epistemically constrained? Wright’s point 
is that if we are only entitled to use intuitionistically acceptable 
logical moves we cannot show that the existence of disagreement 
45 This line of argument only presents a problem if we take it for granted that the 
truth-predicate for discourse about fi ctional characters is epistemically constrained. 
I take it to be implausible to deny this. Cf. Miller 2004. 
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entails cognitive shortcoming, even in the presence of epistemically 
constrained truth. But why should we think that we are only entitled to 
intuitionistic logic? The answer is presumably that that we should adopt 
an intuitionistic logic in areas where truth is epistemically constrained, 
and that ex hypothesi it is so constrained in this case.
However, there is one slight wrinkle that needs to be considered. To 
block the Sainsbury/Shapiro & Taschek worry, we presumably need to 
show that it is appropriate to use an intuitionistic logic not for reason-
ing about claims about a fi ction, but for reasoning about claims about 
individual’s epistemic shortcomings about fi ction. It is at least not obvi-
ous that the truth predicate for this rather restricted domain might not 
be one that made classical, rather than intuitionistic, logic valid. 
It is, at any rate, not immediately clear that truths about epistemic 
shortcomings are in general epistemically constrained. For example, 
it seems plausible that a reliabilist talking about knowledge might 
well think that there were some (in principle) unknowable truths 
about which processes are reliable, and hence that there were some 
unknowable truths about individuals failing on a particular occasion to 
instantiate those processes, without exposing her view to knockdown 
refutation. 
Luckily, though, a defender of the idea that there may be truth 
predicates that lack cognitive command does not need to make a 
claim as strong as this potentially problematic one. It is enough for her 
purposes if she can show that the truth-predicate for attributions of 
cognitive shortcomings about whichever domain it is that she takes to 
lack cognitive command is epistemically constrained. In this particular 
case, then, what is required is a defense of the view that claims about 
cognitive shortcomings with respect to truths about works of fi ction are 
epistemically constrained.46 
On the face of it, the view seems fairly plausible. If someone is 
going wrong about Hamlet, it ought to be possible to give some sort of 
account of what they are missing, and how they have come to miss it. 
This seems to be little more than a corollary of the suggestion that truths 
about fi ction are epistemically constrained. This line of thought can be 
fl eshed out a little with the help of the following argument. Suppose A 
is wrong about q, where q is some question about a fi ctional text, and 
it is not knowable that A is wrong about q, and suppose the answer to 
q is knowable. Then presumably it is possible for A to know what he 
thinks about q, and to tell others — and in particular those who know 
46 Given that the truth about works of fi ction is similarly constrained: if not, the 
Sainsbury/Shapiro & Taschek argument doesn’t get off the ground. 
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the truth about q.47 So it is knowable that A has a cognitive shortcoming 
with respect to q.
If this line of thought is correct, then the Sainsbury/Shapiro and 
Taschek worry does not undermine the view I have been advocating.48 
Let us turn to other worries. 
IX  Lewis on Truths about Fiction
It might be suggested that my claim that fi ctional discourse lacks cogni-
tive command depends on a very naïve account of what it is for sen-
tences such as H and M to be true. Furthermore one might suspect that 
a more sophisticated account along lines suggested by David Lewis 
(Lewıs 1983)49 would undermine the argument here.50 However, I do 
not think that this is so.
Lewis’s account runs as follows51: Defi ne a B-world as a world in 
which all the mutual knowledge of the story-teller’s intended audience 
47 Notice that the argument here — such as it is — requires only intuitionistically 
acceptable steps: I have in effect provided a recipe to transform knowledge of the 
truth about q into knowledge of A’s epistemic shortcomings with respect to q. 
(Incidentally, one might think that considerations about individual knowers having 
epistemic blindspots could cause problems here: suppose it is impossible for A to 
know what the answer to q might be, and also impossible for anyone who knows 
A’s answer to q to be knowledgeable with respect to q. For example, suppose A is 
suffi ciently sure of herself not to be capable of entertaining an alternative answer, and 
suffi ciently persuasive to be invariably capable of compelling agreement.) Then the 
truth about A’s cognitive shortcoming might be unknowable — because unbelievable 
— without there being any epistemically unconstrained truths about fi ctions.
  However, while I think that considerations of this sort might undermine 
an argument that tried to show that wherever truth about X is epistemically 
constrained, truth about cognitive shortcomings with respect to X is similarly 
constrained, I also take it to be reasonable to think that there are no individuals 
who are so equipped as to generate this sort of blindspot in the particular case 
of knowledge about fi ction. Many of us are just too opinionated to allow that to 
occur. 
48 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for 
alerting me to a problem with a prior draft of this section.
49 Wolterstorff 1976 gives a similar account.
50 Lewis avoids commitment to fi ctional characters as abstract objects by adopting 
an elliptical reading of statements such as M. But this part of his view strikes me as 
being independent from his views about the truth conditions of such statements, 
however they are best construed.
51 Leaving out complications about inconsistent fi ctions and fi ctional carry-over 
(both of which Lewis notes and discusses). It seems to me that an account amended 
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is true, and an S-world as one in which the story teller is really doing 
what he purports to be doing when he tells the story. ‘In the fi ction, p’ is 
true provided that p is true in the closest S-world to the closest B-world 
to the actual world.52 
However convincing this analysis may be as an account of the truth-
conditions of sentences such as H and S, it is not clear that it provides 
support for the claim that fi ctional discourse possesses Cognitive Com-
mand. There are three reasons why this so. One of them has to do with 
the identifi cation of the B-world. The other two have to do with ques-
tions about what the appropriate metric on possible worlds might be in 
this context — in other words on questions about which world is the 
closest S-world to the B-world.
The fi rst thing to notice is that since it may be indeterminate exactly 
what the author’s intended audience is, there may be consequent in-
determinacies as to which possible worlds are B-worlds. The sort of 
case which I have in mind here is one in which the author may have 
no settled view as to exactly which groups of people his work is aimed 
at. Consider the case of an English-speaking novelist whose work is 
published in England and only subsequently in the United States and 
Canada. It may be that he intended his audience to consist of English, 
American and Canadian novel-buyers. Or it may be that his immedi-
ate intended audience was only the English novel buying public, and 
that Americans and Canadians stand in the same sort of relation to it 
that late twentieth-century readers stand to the works of at least some 
nineteenth century novelists — that is, as people who need to think 
themselves into a set of slightly alien assumptions if they are to make 
correct judgments about what (beyond what is explicitly mentioned in 
the text) is true of characters in the novel. Or, as in the case in which I 
am interested, the novelist may have no fi xed intentions here — he may 
for example, never have considered the question, and when it is put to 
him, be genuinely unsure how to reply.53
This will only matter (as far as determining which worlds are B-
worlds is concerned) if there are differences in what counts as com-
mon knowledge among the different possible candidates for being the 
along the lines which Lewis discusses may give a plausible account of fi ctional 
truth, but one that is no more likely to secure Cognitive Command about fi ctional 
discourse than the simplifi ed account considered here. 
52 The actual world may not be a B-world, since on Lewis’s account of mutual 
knowledge some items of mutual knowledge may not be true — see Lewis 1983.
53 This is only one sort of reason there might be for thinking that the author’s intentions 
may leave the question of what his intended audience is indeterminate.
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intended audience. It is hard, though, to think of any good reasons 
why such differences should not exist. This will be particularly true 
when we bear in mind that different intended audience candidates may 
vary in age, cultural background, level of education and well- or ill-in-
formedness about other members of the intended audience candidate 
and that potential items of common knowledge among intended audi-
ence members may relate to moral values, plausible kinds of motiva-
tion and very general beliefs about which sorts of enterprises are likely 
to succeed and which are likely to fail. 
Indeterminacies in the intentions of the author vis-à-vis his audi-
ence may make it indeterminate which worlds are B-worlds, and hence 
which B-world is the closest B-world to the actual world.54 Even if we 
put this aside, though, and assume that this question receives a deter-
minate answer, there may also be no determinate answer to the ques-
tion of which S-world is the closest to a given B-world. Two reasons 
for this need to be considered. The fi rst is that, as in the closely related 
case of counterfactuals, the appropriate metric on possible worlds does 
not exist independently of the concerns and interests of the people to 
whom a given utterance is addressed. So the indeterminacies that we 
encountered when trying to say which worlds were B-worlds will re-
turn to plague us here.
Finally, and perhaps most signifi cantly for my purposes, it is argu-
able that in the case of fi ction, questions of aesthetic appropriateness 
may be relevant to judging the distance between possible worlds. Con-
sider again the case of two individuals discussing the vexed question of 
Hamlet’s sanity. Questions about what is likely to have been common 
knowledge among Shakespeare’s intended audience may be relevant to 
satisfying this question. Plausible answers to such questions will help 
us to settle which worlds are B-worlds for Hamlet, and even which 
B-world is the closest world to the actual world. But even so, it seems 
permissible to think that the question of whether an S-world in which 
Hamlet is mad is closer to this B-world than an S-world in which he 
is not may turn on questions about which situation makes for a more 
aesthetically satisfying story.55 To say this need not be say something 
which is incompatible with Lewis’s account of fi ctional truth, but only 
to say that the sorts of world which count as close when we are trying 
54 That is to say, there will be some worlds of which it is indeterminate whether they 
are B-worlds or not. There may be other worlds where this question receives a 
perfectly determinate answer.
55 Clearly the notion of something’s being aesthetically satisfying is one that needs 
further explication.
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to determine what is true in a fi ction may be very different from the 
sorts of world that count as close when we are trying to assess a real 
world counterfactual.56
Do the points that I have made constitute grounds for thinking that, 
even on Lewis’s account, fi ctional discourse lacks cognitive command? 
Someone might doubt it for the following reason. There is an impor-
tant difference, she might say, between sentences in a discourse be-
ing indeterminate in truth-value, and that discourse lacking cognitive 
command. Suppose that certain sentences in an area of discourse are 
indeterminate in truth-value, and suppose that two individuals differ 
in their assignments of truth-values to them. It is a non sequitur to say 
that the difference between them does not involve one of the parties 
in cognitive error. In fact, both parties can be convicted of such error 
precisely insofar as they are committed to assigning truth-values to a 
sentence whose truth-value is in fact indeterminate. 
As far as it goes, this response is justifi ed. The fact that a discourse 
contains sentences whose truth-value is indeterminate does not show 
that it lacks cognitive command. Consider two critics who disagree 
about Hamlet’s shoe-size — we can surely say that both have made the 
‘cognitive error’ of thinking that there is a determinate answer to this 
question when in fact there is not. 
On the other hand, it is not obvious that it follows from the fact 
that certain sentences do not have a determinate truth-value that any 
disagreement about them involves something worth describing as 
cognitive error. It all depends on why the discourse admits sentenc-
es whose truth-value is indeterminate. Consider Wright’s paradigm 
case of an area of discourse that lacks cognitive command: judgments 
about what is funny. Suppose two otherwise competent judges dis-
agree about whether a particular joke is funny. This difference in their 
judgments may be explicable in terms of a difference in sensibility 
— a difference between two people’s senses of humour. This differ-
ence is, in the hypothesised case, suffi cient to explain the difference 
in judgment. We do not need to refer to the claim that the sentence 
has indeterminate truth-value to explain it. So the fact that the two 
individuals have made a mistake in this respect is irrelevant to the 
question of whether discourse about what is funny possesses Cogni-
tive Command or not.
56 In claiming that this view is compatible with Lewis’s analysis, I do not wish to 
commit myself to the claim that Lewis would have endorsed the points that I am 
making, but only that they are consistent with (at least the letter of) his analysis.
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 Of course, Wright’s formulation of his Cognitive Command crite-
rion does seem to allow a response to this. The idea that a difference of 
opinion has to ‘involve’ cognitive error is very undemanding, and does 
seem to leave room for the idea that if two people have different views 
on a sentence whose truth value is in fact undetermined then some sort 
of cognitive error is concerned. Taking a sentence that has no determi-
nate truth-value to have one is clearly an error of some sort. Someone 
who wants to deny that it is properly called ‘cognitive’ is likely to have 
their work cut out in giving a non ad hoc characterisation of what is 
cognitive that avoids this outcome.
However, there is an alternative strategy that may be more likely to 
succeed. If we read Wright’s account in such a way as to require that 
cognitive error be not only ‘involved’ in any difference of opinion in 
the discourse but also involved in the explanation of such differences 
of opinion, then we can see how the claim that comic discourse lacks 
cognitive command can be salvaged.
Bearing this in mind we can now return to the question of whether, 
given an account like Lewis’s, sentences about fi ction can be regarded as 
lacking cognitive command. The key point is that although the fi rst two 
sorts of consideration that I identifi ed earlier as generating indetermi-
nacy as to what is true in the fi ction may not be suffi cient for generating 
breakdowns of cognitive command, the third is. If the argument above 
carries any weight, then Lewis’s account still leaves room for aesthetic 
sensibilities to play a role in determining what is true in a fi ction. And 
since there is no reason to regard differences in aesthetic sensibility as 
involving cognitive error any more than differences in sense of humour, 
this seems to have the consequence that sentences about what is true in 
a fi ction lack cognitive command. 
 The sorts of sentences that are likely to lead to there being a break-
down in cognitive command in fi ctional discourse are, then, ones in 
which what are, broadly speaking, aesthetic criteria such as overall co-
herence, interest, and so on play a role in determining their truth. Plau-
sibly, sentences about whether Hamlet is really mad or not fall into this 
category in a way in which sentences about Hamlet’s shoe-size or hair 
colour do not.57
57 Shakespeare scholars please note that nothing is supposed to hang on the exact 
choice of example here, but only the type of example. 
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X  Fiction and Schmiction
One might still attempt to press the lightness of being objection by mak-
ing the following move. Suppose we grant that our actual fi ctional dis-
course lacks cognitive command. Still, we could imagine beings whose 
imaginative responses to fi ction did not vary in the ways that ours did. 
Such creatures, one might think, would be able to engage in a form of 
discourse — let us call it schmictional discourse, which would not lack 
cognitive command. Nevertheless, the Platonist ought to have qualms 
about allowing the schmictional character Hamlet the same ontological 
status as the number two.
As it stands, the objection fails. Although it might be true that dis-
agreements about schmiction could always be traced to vagueness, dif-
ferent evidential thresholds, or vagueness, it would not necessarily be 
the case that this was true a priori. But one might think that this prob-
lem could be overcome, by supposing discourse about schmiction to 
be regimented in the following way: no sentence of superschmictional 
discourse is acceptable if any competent schmiction-consumer demurs 
from it. Clearly superschmictional discourse would not be bivalent 
— there would be sentences in it for which neither they nor their nega-
tion would be true. But it seems as though it would possess Cognitive 
Command. For it would follow from the rules of superschmictional 
discourse — and thus be a priori — that any disagreement about the 
truth of a superschmictional claim would involve cognitive error on 
the part of both participants. For both participants would be mistaken 
about their belief that the claim they were making was acceptable to all 
participants in the discourse. 
Should the Platonist be worried? I think not. There are two points she 
can make. First of all, she might try to beef up the Cognitive Command 
criterion by insisting that the cognitive errors referred to in Wright’s 
formulation should be errors about matters other than the judgments 
of other speakers. This reformulation need not be ad hoc. Something 
like it will be needed if Cognitive Command is to survive as a real-
ism-relevant test. Without it, any area of discourse that lacks Cognitive 
Command can be conceived of as potentially possessing a more objec-
tive shadow. 
Second, she can point out that to the extent which they have been 
fully sketched out here both schmictional and superschmictional dis-
course differ from real fi ctional discourse so much that it is not clear 
that our intuitions about the ontological status of superschmictional 
characters carry much probative force. One way of fl eshing this point 
out would be to point up the analogies between the ways in which su-
perschmictional discourse has been endowed with cognitive command, 
and the way in which some forms of legal discourse could similarly be 
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endowed with it. A hypothetical intuition that legal entities have little 
ontological standing carries much less weight than a similar intuition 
about fi ction.58
XI  The Objection from Pretence
One fi nal objection to the arithmetical Platonist needs to be considered. 
I shall call it the objection from pretence.59 It runs as follows. ‘Essen-
tially, when we tell a story, we are engaged in an act of pretence. But 
you can’t bring something into existence just by pretending. However, 
if we adopt the account of fi ctional entities proposed here, this is ex-
actly what we are doing. So there must be something wrong with the 
account.’
We need to notice two things about this objection. First of all, it is not 
true, strictly speaking, that we cannot bring anything into existence just 
by pretending. Suppose it is true that fi ction essentially involves acts 
of pretence. Then, on the assumption that stories are objects in good 
ontological standing,60 stories are objects that we create by engaging 
in acts of pretence. So are acts of pretence themselves. There is nothing 
particularly paradoxical about this.
To be compelling, the objection must be based on the idea that we 
cannot bring objects into existence just by pretending that those very 
objects exist. Despite its initial plausibility, this is a claim that the Pla-
tonist can deny. How is this denial to be made plausible?
There are two closely related things that can be said. First, although 
fi ction is closely related to pretence, it is not just pretence. Someone 
who tells a story can only do so in virtue of a large number of back-
ground conventions: not just linguistic conventions, but conventions 
58 Note that this point is consistent with denying that legal or superschmictional 
entities have as much ontological standing as stones or elementary particles. 
We can appeal to Wright’s Wide Cosmological role criterion here. However, for 
reasons I have already given, I don’t think the Wide Cosmological Role test is 
especially helpful for the arithmetical Platonist.
59 Evans 1982 argues that an account of the sort that I have been advocating runs 
into diffi culties since it denies the obvious element of pretence that enters into 
talk about fi ctional characters. But it is possible to concede — as I am doing here 
— that such discourse depends on pretence without necessarily claiming — as 
Evans wants to that it consists solely of pretence, and that the apparent assertions 
which occur in it are merely pretend assertions.
60 Since stories can be the referents of singular terms, this is something that anyone 
who is at all attracted by the minimal Platonist view ought to concede. 
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about what counts as telling a story, what sorts of background assump-
tions about the characters in it can safely be made, what inferences one 
may make about aspects of the story that are not explicitly mentioned, 
and so on. It is only against the background of this set of conventions 
that the pretence that constitutes story-telling gains its ontologically in-
fl ationary powers.61
Second, once the dependence of fi ction on prior conventions is ac-
cepted, it is possible to see analogies between the claim that the Pla-
tonist makes about fi ction and other areas in which linguistic action 
has surprising ontological power. Again, legal contexts provide a use-
ful comparison. Consider the act of setting up a legal corporation. This 
is something that can be accomplished by a series of linguistic transac-
tions — but, again, not by bare linguistic acts, but by acts performed in 
the appropriate context and with the appropriate conventional back-
ing. Seen in this light, the idea that we can bring fi ctional characters 
into existence just by talking about them seems less singular and less 
paradoxical.
XII  Conclusion
I have argued that the minimal Platonist has nothing to fear from the 
lightness of being objection. My argument has had two strands to it. The 
fi rst is that fi ctional characters are of less obviously dubious ontological 
standing than the objector supposes. The second is that the Platonist 
need not say that there are no signifi cant differences of ontological 
status between numbers and fi ctional characters. Like sixth-century 
neo-Platonists (though no doubt for very different reasons!) modern 
arithmetical Platonists should hold that reality comes in degrees.62
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61 This seems to me to be in the spirit of Lewis 1983, 276.
62 I am grateful to John Divers for encouragement in the early stages of my thinking 
about this issue, and to audiences at Bilkent and Bogaziçi Universities, and at a 
conference on ‘Analysing Aesthetics’ at the University of Manchester for helpful 
discussion. Other than those specifi cally mentioned in the text, Andrew McGona-
gall, Michael Morris, Simon Wigley, and Ilhan Inan made useful comments, as did 
two helpful but anonymous referees for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 
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